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Transformation of the Turkish
Diyanet both at Home and Abroad:
Three Stages 
Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
Since the 1937 Constitutional amendment, Turkey defines itself as a secular state despite
its Ottoman legacy on which it was founded and a Sunni Muslim majority. On the face of
this clear Constitutional standing, secularism is still a broadly debated issue due to the
promotion of  fundamentally  different  opinions  on  state-religion  relations  by  various
socio-political groups. In the current context, how much of Turkish secularism remains in
its initial form is open to debate despite the Constitutional protection. The Directorate of
Religious  Affairs  (Diyanet)  holds  the  centre  stage  in  the  secularism  debate  as  an
institution which, through its own journey, explains the historical development of that
debate. In an idiosyncratic way, Diyanet was officially formed in 1924 by law number 429
before the endorsement of secularism in the Constitution. The Law states the raison d’être
of Diyanet as “management of prayer houses and dealing with the belief and practices of
Islam which  falls  outside  the  regulations  legislated  and  executed  by  Grand  National
Assembly”. In practice however, there has always been institutions to manage religions
during both Byzantine and Ottoman times. In a general framework, Diyanet has been a
reincarnation of institutional management of religions and as a central institution since
the foundation of the Republic; it has acted as both the cause and effect in the debates
pertaining to state-society-religion relations.
There is a significant scholarly literature on the issues of religions, religious institutions
and their multidimensional influence on society and political machinery. Fox (2008) was
one of the scholars who have let the genie out of the bottle by unearthing that every state
instrumentalises  religion,  but  some  of  them  exaggerate  the  mark  through  some
parameters. The variety of roles that religion play have been analysed broadly both in
relation to domestic politics (Koesel 2014; Gill  1998; Gurses 2015; Kuru 2011; Gunning
2008) and to foreign policy (Sandal & Fox 2013; Haynes 2008; Warner & Walker 2011; Hurd
2007;  Snyder  2011;  Marie  2017).  Gill  and  Keshavarzian  (1999)  have  confirmed  the
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importance of religious institutions in social, economic and political arenas, and made
inroads to revealing the roles and functions of religious institutions. While Mandaville
(2010) underlines the impact of religious institutions on the regulation of individuals’
socio-political life via management of religion, some others bring forward the positive
roles that religious institutions have played in democratic transitions in South Asian
(Cheng & Brown 2006), Catholic (Gill 2008; Philpott 2004), and Muslim majority countries
(Stepan & Linz 2013). Furthermore, the variety of religious institutions and their roles
have been subject to studies on religion and globalisation (Haynes 2009), transnationalism
(Djupe  & Gilbert  2008),  and  conflict  management  (Ghose  &  James  2005).  A  different
perspective is laid out by Sandal (2011) who argues that a religious institution acts as an
epistemic  community  through  its  clergy,  providing  expertise  that  informs  and  even
programs  a  political  agenda  to  a  certain  interest  group  or  even  an  entire  body  of
adherents. A cross examination of these ideas reveal that Diyanet’s position, role and
symbiotic relationship with the Turkish state do not give this religious state institution
its proper position in any of these perspectives. Therefore, the question “what kind of a
religious institution is  Diyanet?” remains a kick off  sentence for a vigorous research
which it undoubtedly deserves.
Maritato (2015: 434) clearly expresses the founding mentality of Diyanet which reflects
the early Republican elite’s positivist-nationalist perspective on religion in the public
sphere.  In  a  similar  vein,  while  Gözaydın  (2008:  13)  defines  Diyanet as  a  laik1 
administrative unit of Turkish Republic charged with the duty of enlightening the society
about religion and conducting Islamic practices, Öktem (2012: 40) argues that Diyanet is a
government body of laik Turkey which deals with all religious issues of Sunni citizens on
behalf of the state. Lord (2017: 49) focuses on Diyanet’s monopoly on controlling Sunni
Islamic life in Turkey since its foundation, while Çitak (2013: 169) places the focus on the
grounds of foreign policy and deals with the role of Diyanet as an external instrument to
build and consolidate national unity among the Turkish communities abroad, since the
1970s. In recent studies it has also been argued that the instrumentalisation of Diyanet in
domestic and foreign policy has been upsetting the secular sections of Turkey (Öztürk &
Sözeri 2018) due to its role of imposing religion and legitimizing government policies
through a religious discourse since the beginning of the 2000s (Öztürk 2016).
Most studies on Diyanet do not carry out a deep engagement and elaboration regarding
theories  of  secularism  and  approaches  to  religion-politics  relations,  but  these  are
necessities in examining Turkey’s unique understanding of laiklik2 for the society and
Diyanet as an institutional arm of it. In a similar vein, most scholarly attempts to explore
the various activities of Diyanet in different periods and geographies do not touch upon
the question of what kind of religious institution Diyanet is by creating a theoretical link
with the previous literature on religious intuitions. On the face of such shortcomings, one
thing is clear: Diyanet is a transnational state apparatus with an ever-changing nature
depending on the Turkish governments’ preferences in terms of domestic and foreign
policy. In such a context, this article aims to discuss the various roles and activities of
Diyanet in the domestic and foreign policy of Turkey as a state institution of religion. It
builds  a  claim that  Diyanet  should  be  studied  in  three  different  stages  in  which its
characteristics  as  a  religious  institution and the  overall  laik  settings  of  Turkey have
changed. 
Among many social and political factors and their overall impact on the state, laiklik and
the roles of Diyanet have recently been changing in Turkey. The main turning points
Transformation of the Turkish Diyanet both at Home and Abroad: Three Stages
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 27 | 2018
2
were the results of critical junctions such as; coup d’état and others states of exception,
and have affected the understanding and implementations of laiklik through changes in
the  structure,  impact  and  assigned  positions  of  Diyanet.  In  order  to  gain  a  deeper
understanding of these, this article analyses the various states of Turkish laiklik and the
transformation  of  Diyanet within  an  interwoven  structure  of  Turkish  domestic  and
foreign political life. Therefore, it begins with an overview of the establishment of laiklik 
and foundation of Diyanet in the early Republican period and explains the turning points
of  laiklik and Diyanet  throughout modern Turkish history.  Secondly,  it  addresses  the
transformation of Diyanet’s transnational activities in the three aforementioned stages. 
 
Periodization of Turkish Laiklik and Diyanet from the
Early Republican Period to AKP Times
Diyanet,  like  many  other  Republican  institutions,  was  a  continuation  of  Ottoman
institutions as part of a reformed structure. When the Republic was founded, Law 429 was
proposed  by  Siirt  deputy  Halil  Hulki  Efendi  and  50  other  Parliament  members.  It
abolished the Ministry of Sharia and Pious Foundations and General Staff on 3 March 1924
and  established Diyanet in  its  place.  This  interference  indicates  the  importance  of
religious issues for the new-born Republic and exhibits the mindset of the Republican
elite regarding state-religion relations. In the motion of this law, the following arguments
were made: 
Religion and army being involved in political currents invites inconveniences. This
reality  has  been  accepted  a  ground  rule  by  all  the  civilized  nations  and
governments.  For  this  reason,  the  existence  of  the  already-obsolete  Ministry  of
Sharia and Pious Foundations, as well as Ministry of General Staff in the political
body of the Republic of Turkey, which undertakes the mission of providing a new
entity, would not be withstanding. Upon abolition of the Ministry of Sharia and
Pious Foundations,  it  is a natural result that all  the pious foundations would be
yielded to the people and governed accordingly. (Gözaydın 2009: 26).
Diyanet  has  inherited  the  historical  legacy  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  regarding  state-
religion relations and has become an existential institution for the Republic. So there has
been coexistence between Diyanet and the overall  nature of Republic in harmonious,
tense and conflictual ways. Diyanet was founded to regulate the collective and individual
manifestations  of  Islam  in  public  and  private  spaces,  and  to  manage  all  Islamic
institutions. In this regard, it is fair to argue that the new Republic had a monopolistic
and interventionist mind-set on the management of religious issues. Diyanet has always
had the upper hand in religious debates vis-à-vis the civic perspectives when it came to
the matter of legitimacy. 
The first phase started in 1924, when Turkey was not constitutionally laik, and lasted until
1960. In the formative years of the Republic, the founding elite positioned Diyanet in
recognition of its importance. However, it was not given a ministerial status in order to
deny it a policy making position. Therefore, it would be fair to say that the Diyanet was
founded  as  an  administrative  unit  from  the  very  beginning,  which  is  a  defining
characteristic of Turkish secularism. Seemingly, assigning religious affairs to an entity
within the technical administration status falls in line with the secular settings of the
country.  However,  it  gives  the government huge leverage on religious discourse and
practice and renders the mechanism hierarchical as it favours the government. While the
government decided on religious policies, Diyanet could only inform the government on
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religious issues and act as an administrative body. Viewed horizontally however, Diyanet
exercises a huge influence on the society since it creates and disseminates official Islam
and  manages  the  places  of  worship.  It  would  be  fair  to  say  that  while  vertically
incompetent since it cannot decide on policies, Diyanet is extremely competent from a
horizontal perspective. 
The Constitutional amendment that made laiklik official set a turning point regarding
religion-politics and society relations in Turkey. “The religion of the state is Islam” clause
was removed from the Constitution in 1928 and in 1937, laiklik was introduced as one of
the  fundamental  constitutional  characteristics  of  the  new  regime.  The  historical
formation of Diyanet indicates that the Turkish conception of secularism, laiklik, presents
itself as the control of religion by the state rather than separation of state from religion
(s) as claimed by the Kemalist discourse. Frequently, Diyanet has acted as the guardian of
the  existing  regime,  bringing  Islamic  legitimacy  to  it.  As  a  state  apparatus,  Diyanet
securitized  government  policies  and  made  them  into  undebatable  matters  of  high
politics. There exists occasionally seeking approval from an entity that they designed as
the religious organization, as well as using it as the propagator of the official version of
Islam and the inspector of  different groups;  however,  here,  the ultimate goal,  unlike
future policies, is to disengage religion from other social organizations and functions as
much as possible, in line with the action plans on structural social changes. All in all,
Turkish  secularism has  never  been  intended  as  the  independence  or  impartiality  of
religious  matters  from  state  policies.  Under  the  influence  of  vulgar  positivism,  the
founders of the Republic perceived religion as obsolete as it was a rival, even a danger.
However, banning religious elements from the public space altogether or staying out of
the  management  of  the  religious  field  was  not  an  option  for  the  state  centric
modernization of Turkey. Therefore, the founders of the Republic seem to have assigned
two major functions to Diyanet;  providing a public service by organizing and leading
religious practice and protecting the laik order by bringing legitimacy to it. A by-product
of this institutionalization was the ability to keep unwanted civic formations, such as
communities and Sufi orders, under check by drawing red lines on religious matters. The
Diyanet has been a vital institution in the social engineering processes of the ruling elite
by creating an “accepted” Islam which was envisaged as a religion that is  ultimately
passive in the public space. Thus, the laik Turkish state has defined an official Islam under
the body of Diyanet and designated the other Sunni religious communities as unofficial
(Akgönül 2005). 
The role and the position of Diyanet are also related to the lack of an organized clergy in
(Sunni) Islam unlike the church in (Catholic) Christianity3.  Therefore,  it  is one of the
primary reasons that the state considers religious service as a public duty. The Diyanet
has undertaken this public service as a response to a major public need and played an
essential role in the production and reshaping of  religiousness in Turkey during the
Republican  period.  At  this  point,  a  major  criticism  towards  Diyanet  is  about  the
organization’s  exclusive  focus  on  Sunni  Muslims,  taking  the  Hanafi  School  of
jurisprudence as its benchmark. This preference is reflected in the practice of religious
service as well as any publication or broadcast performed by Diyanet. Nevertheless, it is
evident that other groups of Islam exist in Turkey, such as Alevis, Sunni Shafiis or Jafaris,
even  though  their  exact  numbers  are  unknown.  For  this  reason,  the  primary  issue
regarding the state’s provision of religious service in Turkey is its exclusivist nature.
However, the existing situation does not lack legal defence: The religious services for
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Armenian, Jewish and Greek citizens, who constitute the major religious minorities in
Turkey,  are represented by their own congregations in line with the Lausanne Peace
Treaty clauses. Then again, this clause leaves out certain religious communities that are
not considered minorities in the Lausanne Peace Treaty, such as; Assyrians, Chaldean and
Yezidis. Alevis are for instance neither regarded as minorities in any legal framework nor
as regular (Sunni)  Muslims.  These general  characteristics  of  Diyanet and the Turkish
understanding of  laiklik  was formed in  the  founding period of  the  Republic  and has
continued without fundamental changes. 
The second period of Diyanet and the Turkish understanding of laiklik started at a critical
junction in recent Turkish history; the 1960 coup d’état and the following Constitution of
Turkey,  and  ended  in  early  2000s.  In  this  period,  Diyanet  was  again  regulated  by  a
Constitutional article (154) which expanded its activity areas. The relevant law came into
force after a series of long debates in 1965 in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as
Law no 633 on the Foundation and Duties of Diyanet.  Through this law, the duties of
Diyanet  were  designated as;  overseeing  affairs  concerning  belief,  worship  and moral
foundations  of  Islam,  informing  the  public  on  religion,  and  administering  places  of
worship. As stated by Ali Bardakoğlu, a former president of the institution, Diyanet, as a
public  entity,  has  a  special  role  in  producing  and  conveying  religious  knowledge.
(Bardakoğlu 2008). The law gave Diyanet broader jurisdiction and provided it with higher
levels  of  administrative  and  financial  autonomy.  Furthermore,  it  enlarged  the
organizational  structure of  Diyanet,  resulting in the creation of  the High Council  for
Religious Affairs  [Din İşleri  Yüksek Kurulu]  and the re-organization of  numerous other
departments.  These  regulations  were  not  in  conflict  with  Turkish  laiklik,  which  was
primarily defined as the management of religion. 
In the second period, the functions of Diyanet and the understanding of Turkish laiklik
was transformed at yet another critical junction. After the coup d’état of 1980, Diyanet was
assigned the duties of consolidating national solidarity and unity while undertaking the
functions assigned by its  special  statute placed in Article 136 of  the following (1982)
Constitution (Öztürk 2016). The emphasis on solidarity and national unity were strongly
related to the decade long conflict in the 1970s, which left a huge civilian death toll and a
deeply divided society. The new administration after the coup considered religion as an
instrument to unite the society and resist against the spread of communism, which was
popular in 1970s’ Turkey. Therefore, the Diyanet was placed in a position to carry out
these duties intertwined with the management of religion. Instrumentalisation of religion
for greater societal matters was added to Diyanet’s raison d’être which brought a new
function; promoting unity of Turkey and supporting national solidarity using the tenets
of Islam.
During  the  two  periods,  the  issue  of  Sunni  exclusivism and resulting  discrimination
against Alevis are quite important. There is a huge variety of interpretation on Alevism
between the Alevi groups themselves and outside their communities. Alevism claims the
primacy of Caliph Ali  over the other leading figures of his time,  after the passing of
Islamic Prophet Muhammad, and is attributed a privileged position in religion. Alevism
involves more mystical and spiritual elements in its faith structure(s) as a sect outside the
major Sunni groups. More importantly, it was denied full representation in public spaces
during Ottoman times and not accepted as a manifestation of “true Islam”. Meanwhile,
Diyanet claims that it does not treat Alevis and Sunnis differently as these two groups do
not have any differences in religious matters other than some local traditions and beliefs.
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It is frequently stated that Diyanet is founded with a role above different beliefs, sects and
congregations, and aims to provide service to the members of different belief systems.
Equally,  in  recent  court  cases,  the  administration  persistently  emphasizes  that  the
services provided are for every adherent of the Islamic faith,  therefore,  they are not
specific in nature and above different religious denominations. This is the official line of
the Turkish state and is employed consistently. According to Sait Yazıcıoğlu, a former
chairman of Diyanet, the institution was founded in order to provide religious service for
all Muslims regardless of sectarian orientation. The principles of Islam regarding belief,
worship and morality are well defined. The Qur’an that all Muslims of any denomination
recognize as the ultimate Holy Scripture is evident. Informing the public on religion in
line with the Qur’anic rules,  therefore providing religious and national unity, are the
functions of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, as assigned by the law (Gözyadın 2009:
13). Another former president of Diyanet, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, said in a press meeting on
24 March 1993, when he was still  president, that the Presidency was a Constitutional
organization that embraced all the Muslim people of the country and stated that there
was no serious issue in today’s Turkey regarding a distinction between Alevis and Sunnis
(Gözaydın 2009: 37).  As stated by Prof.  Mehmet Görmez, yet another President of the
institution 
the Diyanet cannot assign a religious status; this status may only be defined by the
very followers of this belief. We have always had two red lines that we have never
renounced. One of them is to define Alevism as a non-Islamic belief, and the other is
to define  cemevis  as  an  alternative  to  mosques,  as  a  temple  of  another  belief.
(Öztürk 2016: 637.)
Therefore, another point of conflict has been that between the demands of Alevi groups
and the official stance of the authorities in terms of the legal status of the cemevis, the
gathering houses of Alevis. Cemevis are officially recognized as cultural centres; a token of
cultural wealth with a distinctive cultural and mystical identity that has to be preserved.
The core debate on that matter is whether they constitute alternatives to or equivalents
of  mosques.  However,  the  decisions  taken  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights
regarding this issue give the judgment that the freedom of religion, as it is guaranteed by
the European Convention on Human Rights, does not give a judicial discretion to states on
the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways the religious beliefs are expressed. As per
three decisions taken on the issue in “Manoussakis and others vs. Greece” (26 September
1996); “Hasan and Chaush vs. Bulgaria” (26 October 2000), and “the Metropolitan Church
of Bessarabia and others vs. Moldova” (13 December 2001); no state has the authority to
question any party’s definition of their own beliefs. Accordingly, on 26 April 2016, the
European Court of Human Rights, with its decision no. 6269/10, judged that Articles 9 and
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights were violated by Turkey. Therefore, it
has been decided by the international judicial authority that the demands of services
regarding the Alevi Islamic belief should be given as public service, the cemevis be given
the status of places of worship, the Alevi religious leaders be instated as public officers,
schools to be opened in order to train religious leaders (dede-baba) to yield their Islamic
beliefs to coming generations of the Alevi community, and allocation of an annual share
from the public budget for the services to be provided.
The third period started with AKP rule in 2002 and proceeded with social engineering
policies in line with AKP’s socio-political  imaginary.  A key apparatus for the policies
carried  out  through  political  and  legal  organizations  is  unsurprisingly  Diyanet.  An
amendment to Law no. 633 on the Foundation and Duties of Diyanet had entered into
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force  in  1976,  but  it  was  rescinded  by  the  Constitutional  Court  in  1979.  The  next
amendment was made 31 years later, in 2010. It is striking that the Law that had been
rescinded  was  almost  fully  put  back  into  force  after  31  years,  preserving  its  initial
approach with structural changes such as linking the institution to the President of the
Republic instead of the Prime Minister’s Office. This approach proves that the AKP, just
like CHP, the founding party of the Republic, desires to control the Diyanet and use it to
build and maintain the desired social order. 
In this period, Diyanet has gone through another extension in the scope of its services
and has started to give spiritual guidance in correctional facilities,  detention centres,
nursing homes,  and medical  facilities.  In  order  to  guide families,  women,  youth and
others in society on religious matters, it allocated a budget of 4 million Turkish liras (TL)
to  publications  against  moral  degeneration in  its  2015  Performance  Program.  In  the
relevant document, it was stated that 3.7 million TL was allocated for the objective of
taking an active  role  in  the resolution of  social  issues,  8.5  million TL for  increasing
productivity, 1 million TL for creating and propagating an objective perception of Islam
globally, 76 million TL for reaching all layers of society with religious services, 34 million
TL for activities abroad, and 61 million TL for religious education activities. Beyond that,
a TV channel, named Diyanet TV, was founded in 2012 to broadcast around the clock and
disseminate Diyanet’s perspective on religion and more. Its labour force exceeds 120,000
imams and other civil servants and has a budget of over 2 billion TL (Öztürk 2016).
Consequently, it would be fair to argue that the three critical junctions in contemporary
Turkish  history  affected  the  role  and  position  of  Diyanet  alongside  the  Turkish
understanding of laiklik. In this regard, both the 1960 and 1980 coup d’états have enlarged
the spheres of influence and control of Diyanet and assigned new roles to it,  such as
enlightenment of  society,  consolidation of  national unity and legitimation of  Turkish
nationalism, and coaching the society on religious issues. Yet, it would again be fair to
argue that the most fundamental change regarding the activities of Diyanet and the role
of  religion  occurred  during  AKP  rule.  In  this  regard,  as  noted  previously,  Diyanet’s
budget, administrative capacity (due to legal reforms in 2010) and activities have been
gradually expanding, and its policies have been tightly synchronised with the policies of
the  AKP.  Even  though  Diyanet’s activities  have  never  been  independent  from  the
governments  throughout  the  republican  history,  the  last  remaining  elements  of
autonomy have been lost in the AKP period as the institution has been turned into an
extension of the Party. 
 
Transnationalisation of Diyanet and the three periods
abroad
Even though Diyanet  was officially  founded with the aim of  serving Turkish citizens
within the borders of Turkey, the changing conditions at home and abroad forced Diyanet
to become a transnational state apparatus.  Starting in 1971,  Diyanet began providing
religious services for Turkish citizens abroad and the Turkic societies. Currently, Diyanet
is present abroad with religious affairs consultants within embassies and religious affairs
attachés within consulates of the Republic of Turkey in countries with citizens and kin
(Öktem 2012: 51). This transnationalisation became a necessity for two main reasons: The
first one is the huge wave of migration from Turkey to European countries starting in the
1960s. Hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens have migrated to Germany, France, the
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Netherlands, the UK, Sweden and other European countries seeking job opportunities and
a  small  number  of  them  looking  for  political  asylum.  These  migrants  caused  two
responses from the Turkish state and the host countries. The Turkish state realized the
need to establish links with these migrant groups and maintain ties with them. The host
countries, on the other hand, acknowledged that the “Muslim” migrants needed religious
service; preferably from a moderate actor to avoid any disruption in their internal secular
or  religiously  different  social  environments  (Öztürk  &  Sözeri  2018).  Therefore,  the
Diyanet was  assigned by  the  Turkish  state  to  provide  such services  and was  mostly
welcomed by the host countries with an aim to fill the void in terms of religious discourse
and services to inhibit the influence of radical Islamic groups. 
Based on these priorities, the first stage of Diyanet’s transnationalisation mainly started
in  continental  Europe.  The  Turkish  state  followed  two  different  routes  to  reach  its
citizens abroad. Firstly, Turkey started to appoint religious attaches to the embassies and
consulates of Turkey from Diyanet as religious diplomats in several cities of Germany,
France  and  the  Netherlands.  The  main  duties  of  these  attaches  are  serving  Turkish
citizens  regarding  their  religious  needs,  such  as  supplying  holy  books,  conducting
religious  meetings  and  establishing  coordination  between  host  and  home  countries.
These  attaches  were  appointed  to  promote  the  Turkish  state  discourse,  Turkish
nationalism and Turkish understanding of Islam among the Turkish diaspora groups. Yet,
these official attaches’ spheres of influences were limited and therefore, Turkey put the
second approach into action through the establishment of a religious foundation under
the  control  of  Diyanet.  In  1978,  Religious  Services  Councillorship  [Din  Hizmetleri
Müşavirliği] were established in 18 Turkish Consulates in Germany, and 21 Attachés for
Religious  Services  [Din  Hizmetleri  Ataşeliği]  were  appointed  by  Diyanet at  the  Turkish
embassies and consulates in Europe, the Unites States and Australia (Öztürk & Sözeri
2018: 23). In 1984, the first foundational branch of Diyanet was founded in Germany under
the name of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Turkish Islamische Union der
Anstalt für Religion – DİTİB). With headquarters in Cologne, DİTİB was controlling more
than 900 mosques all over Germany in 2017. In a similar fashion, Turkish Diyanet opened
other organizations in other countries in the 1980s, such as the France DİTİB (Union des
Affaires Culturelles Turco-islamiques) and the Dutch branch of Diyanet.  At this point, one
should keep in  mind that  most  Turkey-originated diaspora  members  are  either  dual
citizens  or  hold  permanent  residence  in  these  countries  (Öztürk  &  Gözaydın  2018).
Therefore,  they have certain capacities to influence both Turkish and host countries’
socio-political life. This provides them with the ability to establish transnational links
that go beyond state borders and gives Turkey spheres of influence beyond its borders.
The second stage of transnationalisation of Diyanet started in the first years of the post-
Cold War period with an extension of Diyanet in the Balkan Peninsula and Asian Turkic
states. In the beginning of the 1990s most Balkan and Asian Turkic states had reached
independence with the fall  of  communist  regimes and identified a need for religious
services for their own Muslim populations. Therefore, most of these countries established
umbrella institutions like Diyanet but their  financial  capacities  and human resources
were  limited.  The  primary  reason  that  they  went  into  a  variety  of  cooperation
agreements with Turkey’s Diyanet was to empower their organizational structures, to fill
the void in the field of religion and to prevent some Salafi and Wahhabi groups from
gaining grounds. Turkey’s laik state identity played a determinant role in this process.
Bulgaria,  Albania,  Macedonia,  Azerbaijan,  Kirgizstan,  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan
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invited  the  Turkish  Diyanet  and  eventually,  Diyanet reached  the  consultancy  level  [
müsteşarlık],  which  is  the  highest  bureaucratic  level  in  these  countries.  With  this
affiliation, Diyanet started to play supervising roles in these countries and give financial
assistance within the conditions of mutual agreements. 
The third stage in the transnationalisation of Diyanet started in the recent years of the
AKP. AKP did not only transform the domestic political structure in Turkey, but also
affected the foreign policy and Diyanet as a result. The praxis of change in foreign policy
was formulated and put into effect by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister who argued that Turkey could become a global power in the post-Cold
War context as long as it followed an expansionist foreign policy based on an Islamist
ideology.  Davutoğlu  focuses  on  the  ontological  differences  between  Islam and  other
civilizations, particularly the West, and asserts that these differences cause an obstacle
for  the  study  of  contemporary  Islam  as  a  subject  of  social  sciences,  especially  in
international  politics.  This  ideological  orientation  brought  a  fundamental  axial
dislocation for  Turkish laiklik  and foreign policy mentality.  In other words,  this  new
orientation aims to utilize Islam as a power-element of foreign policy by making Sunni
Islam more visible and, therefore, making Diyanet a major tool in foreign policy.
At this point,  it  should be noted that under AKP rule DİTİB has started to work as a
parallel diplomacy machine of the Turkish state and has a double-sided role. On the one
hand, the DİTİB is becoming the interlocutor of the states of Western Europe, especially
in  France,  Germany,  Belgium  and  Holland,  indicating  its  willingness  to  become  the
representative of European Islam and imposing the Turkish model. This means that it has
become  the  visible  face  of  Turkish  Islam’s  AKP  understanding.  On  the  other  hand,
alongside this function of identity promotion, the role of the DİTİB remains the identity
maintenance of the Turks of Europe, through the centralised sermons where the message
from the centre to the periphery remains the same:  stay Turk and act  in the world
according to the interest of the Turkish state. With regard to this important function of
the maintenance of identity, the function of the imam as intermediate agent is important.
The  Imam  transmits  the  message  of  identity  and  normative  politics  in  his  official
functions but also is an informal contact with the faithful, in Turkey as well as in Europe. 
Diyanet has reached the peak of its activities under AKP rule, gaining new duties in line
with new state policies and becoming the mouthpiece of the AKP abroad (Çitak 2013). It
started building mosques from the Balkan Peninsula to North America and became more
visible  with its  61 branches in 36 countries  including,  Lithuania,  Russia  and Belarus.
Furthermore, it has been publishing and distributing the Quran and other religious books
in 28 languages and financially supporting official Islamic representative institutions in
the Balkans, Continental Europe and Africa. It has also been supplying educational and
material support for imams in foreign countries and organising official gatherings, such
as Eurasia Islamic Council,  Balkan Countries Islamic Council,  Latin America Countries’
Muslim Summit and African Religious Leaders Summit. Therefore, one might claim that
in the third stage, Diyanet has started to play a leading role among the other Muslim
umbrella organisations. Furthermore, in this third stage, Diyanet started to exceed its
jurisdiction and do things outside the remit of religious service. Allegations of Diyanet
gathering  intelligence  about  anti-AKP  diaspora  groups  in  some  European  countries,
which was justified under the mission of “protecting the national solidarity and unity”
given by the 1982 Constitution, created problems in the host countries and made them
take  measures  against  it.  For  instance,  Austria  recently  passed  an  Islam  law  which
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stipulates that in Austria, an officer from another country will not be permitted to deliver
religious services. Therefore, 65 religious officers of Diyanet will come back to Turkey in a
year, and this practice will end. Again, financial resources for places of worship may only
be provided from within Austria. It would be fair to claim that Diyanet’s intense interest
in  Western  Europe  has  to  do  with AKP’s  ambitions  on  maintaining  control  over  its
electoral body in the diaspora as much as delivering the objective religious service that
Turkish citizens need.
 
Conclusion 
All in all, in this article, I tried to define the Turkish understanding of laiklik and the
transformation of  Diyanet  through turning points  in contemporary Turkey and legal
regulations in the Turkish Constitution(s). Diyanet, as an important yet subservient state
institution, has been heavily influenced by any major policy change in Turkey. Turkish
laiklik,  with  its  Western  and moderate  outlook,  and  Diyanet,  with  its  established
institutional  capacity,  have  been utilized for  political  purposes  at  home and abroad.
Drawing  on  the  explanatory  framework  of  Diyanet’s  historical  journey,  this  study
demonstrates  that  Diyanet  has  gone  through  three  different  stages  in  terms  of  its
domestic and international activities. The transformation of Turkish understanding of
laiklik and particularly the rise of AKP succeeded in integrating a religious discourse into
various fields of policymaking and have expanded Diyanet’s spheres of influence more
than any of its predecessors. It can be argued that these changes would not be feasible
without replacing the secular state identity with a Sunni Islamic one. The promotion of
Sunni  Islam  among  Turkish  and  Muslim  communities  abroad  has  become  both  an
objective and a means to exercise influence on the Muslim minorities, which in practice
means socio-political leverage in the host countries. 
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NOTES
1. The  word  laik expresses  Turkish  secularism  which  sees  religion  as  obsolete  in  terms  of
regulating public spehere and irrevelant when it comes to political legitimacy. 
2. The word, laiklik roughly stands for Turkish secularism
3. Even though, from my point of view there has never been a clergy in (Sunni) Islam, some
prominent scholars, such as Gilles Veinstein, argued that the Ottomans managed to “clericalize”
Sunni Islam and their own state. Further discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper. Yet, for additional reading see Veinstein 2003.
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